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Korea in the Eisenhower Years: 
The U.S.-ROK Alliance as an Asia-Paciﬁc Alliance1
Yasuyo Sakata
I.  Introduction
The U.S.-ROK alliance has served to deter the North Korean threat and 
maintain stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula for over ﬁfty years 
since its formation in the aftermath of the Korean War. But does it have a 
goal beyond peninsula security ---a goal beyond North Korea ? 
This article examines this issue from a historical perspective. The history 
on the U.S.-ROK alliance emphasizes that the alliance was mainly a “local 
alliance” or “peninsular alliance” for peninsular security, to deter and 
defend against the North Korean threat. This certainly has been the primary 
role of the alliance. This article, however, sheds light on another, albeit a 
secondary, aspect of the U.S.-ROK alliance --- the alliance as a “regional 
alliance” or an “Asia-Paciﬁc alliance.” It is argued here that the U.S.-ROK 
alliance served security needs beyond the Korean peninsula, in the broader 
1  This article is an abridged version of the author’s paper titled, “The U.S.-ROK Alliance as an Asia-Paciﬁc 
Alliance: The Western Paciﬁc Collective Security Concept and Korea in the Eisenhower Years,” presented at 
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), 2006 Annual Meeting, June 23-25, 2006 
(Session VII, Panel 37: The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Historical Perspectives on Current Issues), University 
of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas. I would like to express my gratitudes to the panelists, Professors William 
Stueck, James I. Matray, Gregg Brazinsky, and Robert Wampler for the discussion and comments. Research 
was supported by the Kanda University of International Studies research grant.
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Asia-Paciﬁc region--- though conﬁned in the context of the Cold War to 
contain the Soviet and Chinese threat.
The origins of the U.S.-ROK alliance as an Asia-Paciﬁc alliance can be 
found in the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) signed in October 
1953.2 The treaty was primarily signed as a “supplement” to the Korean 
Armistice Agreement (July 27, 1953), to ensure ROK cooperation to the 
Armistice (which President Syngman Rhee refused to sign). The U.S.-ROK 
MDT, however, was also designed as a Paciﬁc defense treaty, modeled 
after the U.S.-Philippines and ANZUS (U.S.-Australia-New Zealand) 
treaties of 1951.3 Similar to the Paciﬁc treaties of 1951, the preamble states 
that both Parties, U.S. and ROK, cooperate for peace and stability in the 
“Paciﬁc area”, and continue to do so, “pending the development of a more 
comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Paciﬁc area.” 4 
At the time of signing the treaty, the Eisenhower administration did not 
have speciﬁc plans for developing a “more comprehensive and ef fective 
system of regional security in the Paciﬁc area”. This phrase was modeled after 
the 1951 Paciﬁc treaties signed during the Truman administration.5 But the 
2   For this argument, see Yasuyo Sakata, “The Origins of the U.S.-ROK Alliance as a “Regional Alliance” : U.S. 
Policy on Asia-Paciﬁc Collective Security and the Formation of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, 1953-54,” Gunsa 
[Military History] (Seoul: Institute for Military History Compilation, ed.) 57 (December 2005). 
3   Ibid.,50-63. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 and 1960 are, in substance, a Paciﬁc defense treaty, but 
the text avoided reference to “Paciﬁc” collective defense, and limited the treaty area to the security of the “Far 
East” to be defended by U.S. forces (not Japanese forces), due to constraints on the use of force and rights to 
collective self-defense in Article IX of the Japanese Constitution of 1947. Japan would contribute bases and 
facilities to U.S. forces for regional defense. Sakamoto Kazuya, Nichibei Doumei no Kizuna (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 
2000); John Swenson-Wright, Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward Japan, 
1945-1960 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), chapter 6.
4   “The Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America,” October 1, 1953 
(effective November 1954), The War History Compilation Committee, ed., The Treaties of National Defense, 
Volume 1 (1945-1980) (Seoul: Ministry of Defense, The Republic of Korea, 1981), 154-157 (emphasis added).
5   The Truman administration had its own “Paciﬁc Pact” idea with offshore island countries, Japan, Philippines, 
Australia, New Zealand, but it was never realized. Sakata, op.cit., 34-37.
3The Western Paciﬁc Collective Security Concept and Korea in the Eisenhower Years: 
The U.S.-ROK Alliance as an Asia-Paciﬁc Alliance
fall of Dienbienphu and the deepening crisis in Indochina in 1954 prompted 
the Eisenhower administration to develop its own concept for collective 
security in the Asia-Paciﬁc, the Western Pacific collective security idea. 
The policy shift to Indochina, brought about new dimensions to U.S.-ROK 
security relations. The value of the U.S.-ROK alliance increased in the 
context of the Western Paciﬁc collective security idea, and the Eisenhower 
administration consciously attempted to integrate South Korea into the 
process.6 
Although the U.S.-ROK defense pact was designed as a Paciﬁc defense 
treaty, there was an inherent difﬁculty for the U.S.-ROK alliance to 
function as a “regional alliance” like the other Paciﬁc alliances. The burden 
of the peninsular defense was large. The parameters of the “Paciﬁc area” 
were not clearly deﬁned, because it was not necessary. The U.S. Forces in 
Korea (USFK) did not function as regional forces with strategic ﬂexibility 
as in the case of the U.S. Forces in Japan. However, there was a role that 
the ROK forces could play in the collective defense of the Asia-Paciﬁc 
beyond the Korean peninsula, namely in Southeast Asia. This aspect led to 
the South Korean participation in the Vietnam War in the 1960’s. 
The Western Paciﬁc collective security concept was never realized, due 
to ambivalence within the Eisenhower administration and with Asian allies, 
including Korea. But the legacies of the Eisenhower years led to the U.S.-
ROK alliance cooperation in the Vietnam War period. Thus, the Eisenhower 
years can be described as the “embryonic stage” of U.S.-ROK alliance as 
an Asia-Paciﬁc alliance, preceding the Vietnam War. 
6  The early stage of this concept is discussed in ibid., 62-71, 78-81.
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In order to understand the “embryonic” phase of the U.S.-ROK alliance 
as an Asia-Pacific alliance, this article examines how the Eisenhower 
administration pursued the Western Paciﬁc collective security concept in 
the 1950’s, with a focus on the Administration’s efforts--- its achievements 
and failures --- to integrate South Korea into this concept. The overall 
scorecard was not satisfactory, as the Western Paciﬁc pact concept itself 
failed, but alternative patterns of regional security cooperation between 
the two countries grew out of this era, which, in turn, will be relevant to its 
evolution in the 1960’s. 
II.  The Western Paciﬁc Collective Security Concept and Korea
NSC 5429/5: The Western Paciﬁc collective security concept
Eisenhower’s New Look policy not only focused on nuclear deterrence, 
but also on collective defense to deal with limited war and subversion at 
regional and local levels. This called for more dependence on allies and 
local forces to ﬁght the ground war, and the U.S. forces only to support 
with mobile strategic striking power. It was perceived that the need for a 
collective security arrangement in Asia was urgent, especially in light of 
the Indochina crisis in the spring of 1954 .7 
Amidst the Indochina crisis, the National Security Council (NSC) 
solicited views from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on how to strengthen the 
U.S. and allied military position in Asia. The JCS submitted a memorandum 
7  Robert Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume V: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 
1953-54 (Washington, D.C. Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986) , chapter 1; John Lewis Gaddis, 
Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), 152-153.
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on April 9, 1954, “United States Strategy for Developing a Position of 
Military Strength in the Far East” (NSC 5416). JCS recommended a 
comprehensive review of Asia policy in light of the rising Communist 
Chinese threat, and advocated, “as a long-range goal”, the “development 
of a regional security arrangement“, i.e., a comprehensive regional security 
arrangement (regional security pact) among the non-communist countries of 
the Far East.8 It was after the fall of Dienbienphu and the settlement of the 
Indochina problem at the Geneva Conference (dividing Vietnam at the 17th 
parallel) that the NSC considered the recommendation by JCS (NSC 5416) 
and conducted a comprehensive review of Asia policy. The ﬁnal version, 
NSC 5429/5, titled “Current U.S. Policy toward the Far East,” was approved 
by the Council on December 22, 1954 and endorsed the idea for a collective 
regional security arrangement in Asia, that the JCS recommended. It stated: 
“Encourage the conditions necessary to form as soon as possible and 
then participate in, a Western Paciﬁc collective defense arrangement 
including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China, and the 
Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the Manila Pact (SEATO) 
and ANZUS.” 9
The Eisenhower administration envisaged an overarching comprehensive 
collective security arrangement in the Asia-Paciﬁc, linking the Northeast 
8   Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter cited as FRUS), 1952-54, vol.XII, part 1, East Asia and the 
Paciﬁc (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1984), 411-421. JCS designated the “Far East 
area” to include Communist China, Korea, Hong Kong, Indochina, Indonesia, the Offshore Island Chain (Japan, 
Ryukyus, Formosa, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand), Malaya, Thailand, and Burma. FRUS 1952-54, 
XII, part.1, op.cit., 412.
9  FRUS 1952-54, XII, pt.1, 1062-1072 (emphasis added).
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Asian/North Paciﬁc allies with Southeast Asia (SEATO) and the ANZUS 
allies in the Southwest Paciﬁc. 
Ambivalence Within
Thus in 1954, formation of a “Western Paciﬁc collective defense 
arrangement” among the U.S., Japan, ROC, ROK, and the Philippines, “as 
soon as possible” became a policy goal. It was a rather difﬁcult goal to 
realize, however, since there was never a ﬁrm consensus on how to pursue 
the goal. 
As evidenced in the JCS memorandum (NSC 5416), the idea was 
supported strongly by JCS Chairman Arthur Radford and other Asia-ﬁrsters 
in the military, such as General James Van Fleet (formerly Commander 
of the Eighth Army in Korea during the Korean War).10 Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles and the State Department also supported it. Dulles, 
dubbed “Pactomania,” was an advocate of establishing a collective security 
network worldwide to counter the Communist threat. But there was 
ambivalence in the Far Eastern Bureau and Northeast Asia Ofﬁce, and the 
Asia-hands called for caution. The difﬁculties of actually realizing such a 
goal were voiced, and the feasibility as well as the desirability of creating 
such a comprehensive collective security arrangement was questioned.
The original State draft of July 30 read, “Encourage these countries 
(Republic of China, Japan, Republic of Korea and Philippines) to consult 
with one another and with us with respect to the formation of a Western 
Paciﬁc collective defense arrangement to parallel and perhaps eventually 
10  Sakata, op.cit., 65, 70.
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be linked with the Southeast Asia defense arrangement.”11 On August 3, 
this was revised by the NSC Planning Board to, “Encourage the formation 
and be prepared to participate in a Western Paciﬁc collective defense 
arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China, and 
the Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the Southeast Asia security 
treaty and ANZUS,”--- to which Robert McClurkin, Acting Director of 
Ofﬁce of Northeastern Affairs sarcastically commented in a memorandum 
to Ambassador John M. Allison (in Tokyo), “[a]s though this [the July 30 
State draft] was not unrealistic enough.”12 This was adopted in the ﬁrst 
draft, NSC 5429 (August 4), which stated, “Encourage [the conditions 
which will make possible](sic) the formation of, and be prepared to 
participate in, a Western Paciﬁc collective defense arrangement ….” and 
was maintained in NSC 5429/2 (August 20) with the brackets deleted.13 To 
McClurkin, the language adopted in NSC 5429/2 represented “the ﬁnal, 
more realistic policy” and “a considerable victory for us at NA [Ofﬁce of 
Northeast Asian Affairs],” reﬂecting the more moderate views of the State 
Department.14 
In light of NSC 5429 deliberations, Secretary Dulles made a public 
comment alluding to the Western Paciﬁc collective security idea and 
invited speculation over U.S. intentions in Asia. At a news conference on 
August 3, Dulles acknowledged a news report that the U.S. government 
was considering a security pact linking the United States, Japan, South 
11   The Acting Director of the Ofﬁce of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Ambassador in Japan (Allison), 
Washington, September 16, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, XII, pt.1, 911-912.
12  Ibid.  
13  FRUS 1952-54, XII, pt.1, 699, 773 (emphasis added).
14  McClurkin to Allison, September 16, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, XII, pt.1, 912.
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Korea and Nationalist China, but that no decision was made, and was only 
under preliminary stage of investigation.15 Ambassador Allison in Tokyo 
pointed out that “there is practically no possibility that Japan at present 
would consider joining any collective security organization” and asked for 
clariﬁcation as to the status of the idea.16 Dulles explained to Allison that 
he did not have any present plans for promoting a security pact including 
Japan, ROK, Formosa and U.S., and perhaps Philippines, though he 
regarded it as “an ultimate possibility.” But at the moment, the “important 
business is to create in the area a sense of interdependence.” Thus, he 
explained that “[i]t is because of this aspect of the matter that I did not 
want to give a totally negative reply to the question which I got at my press 
conference.” 17
In response to Secretary Dulles’s August 3 news conference, the Bureau 
of Far Eastern Affairs (FE) produced a memorandum, titled “Western 
Paciﬁc pact,” and warned that such speculation caused by Dulles’s 
comments is not healthy, and advocated that the State Department should 
make a decision on how to approach this topic. The FE memorandum 
outlined points to consider on a “possible Western Paciﬁc Pact”. The 
Western Paciﬁc collective security pact may be a ﬁve-power military pact, 
including Japan, ROK, ROC and U.S. The Philippines, with the possibility 
of extending the pact in the future, to Australia, New Zealand, and “even 
Indonesia”, and would “parallel and perhaps be linked with the Southeast 
Asian pact”(under negotiation). The Pact would be modeled on the 
15  “New Asian Line-up Studied by Dulles,” The New York Times, August 4, 1954.   
16   The Ambassador in Japan to the Department of State, Tokyo, August 4 1954, FRUS,1952-54, XII, pt.1, 
694-695.
17  The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan, August 5, 1954, FRUS,1952-54, XII, pt.1, 711-712.
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Southeast Asian pact, and present security treaties with ROK, Japan and the 
Philippines should be “superceded” by the new collective security treaty.18 
FE went on to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of such a 
pact. The advantages were for example: satisfying ROK and ROC in 
including them in a regional security pact with the U.S. without requiring 
entry into the Southeast Asia treaty; emphasize completeness in the line 
against Communist aggression, emphasize community of purpose and 
interest, enhance joint planning for defense, habituate the signatories 
to act in concert on military matters, deter Chinese Communists from 
taking Formosa. But the disadvantages would be that it may encourage 
the ROK to attack North Korea, involve U.S. formally in war between 
Chinese Nationalists and Communists, cause concern among Western 
European allies and Asian neutrals of U.S. “rigid and bellicose” stance, 
stimulate Chinese Communists to break out of “encirclement” and foster 
Locarno-type “non-aggression pacts” among Communist-countries in Asia, 
create a cleavage between neutrals and anti-Communists in non-military 
organizations.19 
The FE memorandum also emphasized that “there is “virtually no 
possibility” of realizing such a pact “at present”, because there would not 
be adequate support in Asia. The ROC would agree, but the Philippines, 
ROK would be unenthusiastic because of Japan. ROK’s “violent feelings” 
toward Japan would “completely rule out” the possibility of such a pact. 
Japan also would not be ready to take part, because they are “unprepared 
18   Memorandum from Ogburn to Drumwright, August 12, 1954, in Hiroshi Masuda, ed.,  Rearmament of Japan, 
part 2, 1953-1963 (Congressional Information Service and Maruzen Co., 1998. (microﬁsche # 2-C-20)
19  Ibid.
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psychologically” and “legally” due to constitutional provisions. Japan 
would also not seek closer relations with Nationalist China, but seek 
adjustment of relations with mainland China. Thus, the FE noted, just the 
mere action of mentioning the idea as Secretary Dulles did at the August 
3 press conference caused this idea to be “very much in the air” and FE 
feared that discussion of this concept may actually result in realizing them, 
without adequately considering the consequences. Thus, it recommended 
that the State Department should conduct a “careful study” and “soon come 
to a decision [as to] whether it will encourage such speculation or put an 
end to it.” 20 
McClurkin echoed this cautious view, and advised Ambassador Allison 
that the regional collective security pact was still unrealistic, and wrought 
with difﬁculties. Even the language in NSC 5429/2, he noted should be 
“interpreted with moderation.” There is no question that the conditions 
making possible the formation of a “Northeast Asian pact (or perhaps 
better, a “horizontal” Western Paciﬁc pact)“ require a “greater sense of 
interdependence in the area that presently exists” as Dulles noted. “Until 
the Japanese are themselves ready to engage in such a pact, until Japan-
Korea relations are placed on a more constructive foundation and until 
the reparations problem is settled between Japan and the Philippines, it 
is impossible to foresee any real sense of interdependence or to think of 
a security organization in the area.” But he went on to say, “The long-
term objective simply highlights the necessity of solving these immediate 
20   The memorandum also noted that the ROC Foreign Minister thought it was “impractical” to put the Western 
Paciﬁc countries into one single pact, but suggested instead a series of trilateral pacts linking China-Japan-U.S., 
China- Korea- U.S., China-Philippines-U.S. Ibid.
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problems,” not denying the future of a regional security organization.21 
NSC 5429 deliberations continued, and the State draft (November 12) 
maintained the moderate wording, but in NSC 5429/3 (November 19), 
NSC Planning Board revised the language to, “Encourage the conditions 
necessary to form as soon as possible and then participate in, a Western 
Paciﬁc collective defense arrangement…,” reﬂecting more assertive views 
such as those in JCS.22 This was the language adopted in the ﬁnal version, 
NSC 5429/5. Thus, NSC 5429/5 was a partial “defeat” for the Asia hands 
in the State Department. But in the implementation of the policy, State 
regained its initiative to modify the approach. 
NSC 5514: Promoting Regional Integration of South Korea
In light of the overall Asia policy review, a Korea policy review was 
conducted and approved as NSC 5514 in February 1955.23 The recommendation 
in NSC 5429/5 for a regional collective security arrangement was 
incorporated into NSC 5514, which suggested encouraging the conditions 
to form, “as soon as possible,” a “Western Paciﬁc collective defense 
arrangement” including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China and 
the ROK, eventually linked with the Manila Pact and ANZUS. In light of 
this goal, the document emphasized the need for ROK to develop better 
relations with other free nations in Asia. The text read:
Encourage the development of cooperative relations, mutual respect 
21  McClurkin to Allison, September 16, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, XII, pt.1, 912..  
22  FRUS 1952-54, XII, pt.1, 961, 976 (emphasis added).  
23   NSC 5514, Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on U.S. Objectives and Courses 
of Action in Korea, February 25, 1955, FRUS,1955-57, XXIII, part 2, Korea (USGPO, 1993), 42-48.
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and participation in multilateral activities between the ROK and the 
other free nations of Asia as a means of lessening the dependence of 
the ROK upon the US for political and moral support; endeavor to 
develop a community of interest between the ROK and Japan, and 
also with the Philippines and the Republic of China through the offer 
of U.S. good offices to help resolve outstanding problems and by 
encouragement of joint cooperation.” 24 
In NSC 5514, two directions can be discerned for promoting integration 
of Korea into the Western Paciﬁc collective security framework. One is the 
Northeast Asia dimension, which includes Japan, ROK and the Republic of 
China. The other is ROK linkage with Southeast Asia or SEATO, including 
the Philippines. The following sections examine how the Eisenhower 
administration attempted to integrate South Korea into the Western Paciﬁc 
collective security concept. It deals with the various issues that arose in U.S.-
ROK relations with regard to the Western Paciﬁc regional collective security 
effort. The U.S.-Japan security treaty revision of 1960 25 and the Taiwan 
Straits/offshore island crises (in 1954, 1955, 1958) were major issues, but 
they did not involve South Korea directly, so it will not be discussed here. 
24  FRUS,1955-1957, XXIII, pt. 2, 47.
25   The Hatoyama Cabinet’s Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu visited the United States and proposed revision 
of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in August 1955, but the U.S. declined. Negotiations for treaty revision 
started in 1958 with the Kishi Cabinet (Liberal Democratic Party), supported by Ambassador to Japan Douglas 
MacArthur II, and was concluded in June 1960. There were ideas for revising the treaty into a Western Paciﬁc 
defense treaty but it was not realized. See footnote 3.  
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III. Issues in U.S.-ROK relations
The Eisenhower administration attempted to integrate Korea into the 
Western Paciﬁc collective security arrangement --but with much difﬁculty. 
Eisenhower and the Rhee administration were in disarray over what the 
optimal form of collective security in Asia should be, but there were some 
areas where interests did converge. 
Overall, in terms of integrating Korea into the Western Paciﬁc collective 
security, the Northeast Asia dimension with Japan did not fare well, 
although the ROK continued to develop ties with Nationalist China since 
establishing diplomatic relations in January 1949. Some progress was 
made, however, in Southeast Asia. 
Uneasy Relations between ROK and Japan
Japan-ROK cooperation was an essential element in the development of 
a Western Paciﬁc collective security arrangement. But as of 1954, Japan 
and ROK had not established formal diplomatic relations, and security 
cooperation was still beyond the horizon. Through the good ofﬁces of the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), Japan and ROK began 
normalization talks in 1951, but talks were suspended in 1953.26 Taking 
this situation into account, NSC 5514 recommended that the U.S. should, if 
necessary, provide “good ofﬁces to resolve outstanding problems” between 
26   By 1953, normalization talks were deadlocked over contentious issues, such as ﬁsheries, legal status of Korean 
residents in Japan, property claims and compensation. In the third round of talks in October 1953, the Japanese 
chief delegate Kanichiro Kubota made a statement which legitimized Japanese colonial rule over Korea. The 
statement inﬂamed the Koreans and the talks were suspended indeﬁnitely. Chong-sik Lee, Japan and Korea: 
The Political Dimension (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985), chapter 2.  
14
神田外語大学紀要　第 20 号
the two countries in their normalization talks.27 
South Korea, led by President Syngman Rhee, however, opposed the U.S. 
scheme centered on Japan, and refused to be integrated. To Rhee, Japan 
was illegitimate as a leader of Asia, not just for historical reasons, but also 
for the present. Rhee criticized Japan for being too soft on communism, 
and often voiced these complaints to the U.S.
Besides voicing fears about the resurgence of Japanese militarism,28 
Rhee criticized Japan’s diplomatic overtures with the Communist 
camp: rapprochement with the Soviet Union (1956 Japan-Soviet Joint 
Declaration), limited trade with Communist China, and limited contacts 
with North Korea. This also was a concern to the U.S. (that Japan may 
turn “neutral”), but the same level of anti-communist emotions was not 
shared between Rhee and Eisenhower (who was pursuing “peaceful 
coexistence” with the Soviets in the “Geneva spirit.).29 Thus, this period 
27   A progress report on Korea policy noted “efforts to further tie the ROK into the U.S. security system through 
the Western Paciﬁc security arrangement, called for in NSC 5429/2, have been started by emphasizing to 
the ROK the need for satisfactory working relationships between the ROK and Japan.“ Wary of heightened 
ROK criticisms of U.S. security policies and “propaganda attacks” on Japan, it recommended that the U.S., 
nevertheless, “should continue efforts to formalize broad security arrangements with the ROK,” but also noted 
the difﬁculties, saying that “it may prove impossible, particularly with respect to arrangements involving 
Japan, to do so in the short range.” Second Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board to the 
National Security Council on NSC 170/1, December 29, 1954, FRUS, 1952-54, XV, 1953.
28   See for example, the Dulles-Rhee talks in August 1953. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the 
Ofﬁce of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young), Seoul, August 5, 1953, FRUS, 1952-54, XV, 1473.
29   Rhee instructed diplomats in Washington and Tokyo to convey the message that “Japan is preparing to 
stand with the Communists against the U.S.” and protest against Japanese trade relations with Russia and 
Communist China. Memorandum from the Director of the Ofﬁce of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) 
to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Washington, June 1, 1955, FRUS, 
1955-1957, XXIII, 108. Demonstrations held in front of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul to demand that the U.S. 
cease support of Japan, turned into a riot. Ambassador Yang You Chang recounted the “numerous Japanese 
overtures toward north Korea and other Communist countries as reason for ROK feelings” against Japan. 
Sebald said the U.S. is “just as interested as ROK in having Japan remain anti-Communist” but cautioned 
against the “dangerous” demonstrations. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, 
June 13, 1955, FRUS, 1955-57, XXIII, 113.
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was wrought with frictions over Japan-Korea relations, and the Eisenhower 
administration chose to take a modest role and patiently make the effort to 
improve relations between the two allies. 
The Eisenhower administration closely followed Japan-ROK 
negotiations, and prodded the two countries to resume talks. Despite 
repeated attempts by the U.S., the talks did not resume until April 1958, 
after Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi withdrew the Kubota statement in 
late 1957, in exchange for the release of Japanese ﬁshermen detained in 
Korea. The fourth round, however, stalled again, due to Kishi’s decision 
in March 1959 to repatriate Korean residents in Japan to North Korea 
on “humanitarian” grounds through the International Red Cross. Soon 
domestic politics in both Japan and Korea overtook diplomacy. In April 
1960, after the “Student Revolution,” Rhee resigned after twelve years in 
power and ﬂed to Hawaii. Kishi resigned after the new U.S.-Japan Security 
Treaty in the Diet was passed in June 1960. Normalization talks resumed in 
1960, between the two new administrations in Japan and Korea. The U.S. 
had some hopes for the new Chang Myon regime of the Korean Democratic 
Party, since it was more pragmatic than Rhee and was interested in 
promoting Japan-Korea talks primarily for economic reasons.30 The new 
Ikeda Cabinet (LDP) was also interested in promoting the talks, but the 
Chang government was weak domestically, and soon fell to the military 
30   Swenson-Wright, op.cit., 308, footnote 94. Ambassador to Korea Walter P. McConaughy, noted that he was 
“particularly encouraged” by Foreign Minister Ho Jung’s remarks regarding the settlement of outstanding 
problems in ROK-Japan relations” and believed that “a real opportunity now presented [itself] for making 
substantial progress.” Ambassador MacArthur in Tokyo also recommended that the U.S. should take advantage 
of the new government in Korea to promote better relations between ROK and Japan. Telegram from Embassy 
in Korea to the Department of State, Seoul, April 28, 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, volume XVIII: Japan, Korea 
(USGPO, 1994), 650, footnote 3.
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coup led by Park Chung-hee in May 1961. 
NEATO ?
Despite the frictions, ideas for a NEATO (Northeast Asia Treaty 
Organization)-type of organization---a formal grouping of U.S. with 
Northeast Asian allies, Japan, South Korea, Republic of China-- were aired. 
But the Eisenhower administration understood the difﬁculties of such a 
pact. Differences over Japan’s role, coupled with Japan’s reluctance to enter 
into such pacts, and the lack of formal diplomatic relations between Japan 
and Korea, inhibited its realization.
Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek supported military ties with Japan, 
as part of an effort to strengthen Nationalist China’s position vis-a-vis 
Communist China31. Japan, however, was reluctant about getting entangled 
into collective security organizations, especially with its Northeast Asian 
neighbors, South Korea and Taiwan which pushed a strong anti-Communist 
agenda. A State Department intelligence report noted that, “Japanese 
conservatives are … not willing to envisage participation in a general 
coalition of the anti-Communist powers in Northeast Asia. They object 
most vehemently to military collaboration with the Republic of Korea, at 
least while that government is controlled by Syngman Rhee who in a recent 
election campaign address described Japan as a greater menace than the 
Communists. ... The Japanese also regard President Rhee as a dangerous 
ally, capable of involving nations associated with his administration in a 
31   See Chiang-Dulles talks. Memorandum of Conversation, Taipei, March 16, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol.III, 
China (USGPO,1986), 329-330. 
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new war, an eventuality the Japanese would abhor.”32 
Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II told Secretary Dulles his views: 
“Japan’s two closest allies are Korea and Taiwan. Yet, at present, a 
collective security arrangement with Korea seem out of the question 
because of Korean suspicions, and Japan itself would not wish to enter into 
a collective security arrangement with Taiwan for fear of being dragged 
into a war which might develop because of hostilities breaking out between 
Taiwan and Communist China.” 33
It is interesting to note, however, that Rhee had suggested to Eisenhower, 
a tripartite pact among the United States, South Korea, and Japan.34 
Records show that Rhee had also discussed this with his personal adviser 
and American professor, Robert T. Oliver in 1954. As the Indochina crisis 
continued, Oliver suggested to Rhee that he seize the opportunity to 
improve relations with Japan, and “re-open the question of SEATO that 
will include both Korea and Nationalist China and perhaps with (proper 
safeguards) Japan.35 Rhee replied to Oliver, with a “draft letter” to the State 
Department. In the “draft letter”, Rhee did not deny the possibility of a 
tripartite pact, but only when “conditions” are met. If the “conditions” are 
32   “The Recent and Prospective Foreign Relations of Japan (1956-61),” September 12, 1956, Ofﬁce of 
Intelligence and Research (OIR) Report, No.7331, OIR ﬁles, National Archives-II, cited in Swenson-Wright, 
op.cit., 307, footnote 94. 
33   Letter from the Ambassador in Japan (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State, Tokyo, May 25, 1957, FRUS, 
1955-57, XXIII, Part 1, Japan (USGPO, 1991), 326.
34   Eisenhower stated in a letter to Rhee: “I am very glad to be assured that you share our interest in the 
restoration of genuine harmony and friendship between Japan and Korea. In this connection, the suggestion 
you make for a tripartite treaty between Japan, Korea and the United States seems to me to be well worth 
further exploration. I am asking Ambassador Briggs to discuss this matter with you so that we may have a 
fuller explanation of your ideas about such a treaty.” Letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee, 
Washington, January 31, 1955, FRUS,1955-57, XXIII, pt. 2, 12.
35   Oliver’s letter to Rhee, October 5, 1954 in Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in 
Korea, 1942-1960: A Personal Narrative (Seoul: Panmun Book Company, 1978), 466-467.
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met, “we will try to make a three-nation pact-among United States, Japan 
and Korea --- against any foreign aggression, including aggression among 
themselves, provided that Japan and United States also want such a pact. 
These three nations should then make a joint declaration to the effect that 
they stand for the independence of all the Asiatic nations, and that they will 
help any nation that is attacked by any third power.” 36
The “conditions” Rhee set were similar to ROK demands in the 
normalization talks.37 It was unrealistic, however, that Japan would meet 
those “conditions”, thus in reality, a U.S.-Korea-Japan tripartite pact was 
still a pipe dream. Normalization had to be achieved before any close 
security cooperation could be realized.38
Links with SEATO: the Diplomatic Dimension
In Southeast Asia, which became the focus of Asia policy in the post-
Korean War period, the U.S. established the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) with European allies (Britain and France), ANZUS 
and Asian allies (Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan). Secretary Dulles led 
the negotiations and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (or the 
36   In this “draft letter,” Rhee lamented what he called Dulles’s plan to build up Japan, a “former aggressor in Asia,” 
and conveyed his mistrust toward Japan. Rhee wrote, “If Japan shows a change of heart, so that she wants to 
live in peaceful relations with her neighbors, the past may be forgiven and forgotten, “but to Rhee’s eyes this 
was not so. It is not certain that this letter was sent to State, but Oliver thought this was a reply to him. Rhee’s 
reply to Oliver on October 18, 1954, as a“draft letter” to State Department. Ibid., 468-470.
37  Ibid. 
38   On January 25, 1958, ROK Foreign Minister Cho Chong-hwan supported Secretary Dulles’s proposal for 
closer liaison among non-communist security alliances, but said that the ROK was still reluctant to support the 
inclusion of Japan in a regional alliance, “not because of bilateral differences, but because ROK cannot regard 
Japan as anti-communist.” (Report by U.S. Ambassador to Seoul, February 1958). JOINT WEEKA, 1948-1959, 
vol.7, 1957-1958 (Seoul: Yongjin-sa, 1993), 299. JOINT WEEKA is a collection of weekly reports from the U.S. 
Embassy in Seoul.
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Manila Pact) was signed on September 8, 1954, by the eight nations39. 
Based on the policy objectives in NSC 5429, the U.S. explored the 
possibility of linking SEATO with NEATO to establish a Western Paciﬁc 
collective security pact. During the Manila Pact negotiations, Dulles 
suggested that Japan, South Korea and Taiwan also join the Manila Treaty, 
and expand the Southeast Asia treaty into a Western Paciﬁc pact, but the 
European and ANZUS allies, as well as the Asian allies were reluctant, 
and preferred that it be limited to Southeast Asia. A U.S.-U.K. joint study 
report in July 1954 concluded that initial membership should be limited 
to Southeast Asia and concerned countries, but possibilities were left open 
for invitations to other states that wished to accede or associate themselves 
with the treaty.40 
In early September 1954, as the Manila Treaty was signed, crisis over 
the Nationalist China-controlled Quemoy-Matsu islands broke out. But 
SEATO membership was not expanded to include ROC, so a separate 
pact was signed with the Republic of China on December 2, 1954. Dulles 
emphasized that the U.S.-ROC mutual defense pact “will follow the general 
pattern of other security pacts which the US concluded in the Western 
Paciﬁc” and that the it “ will forge another link in the system of collective 
security established by the various collective defense treaties already 
concluded between the US and other countries in the Pacific area.” The 
preamble of the treaty included reference to the goal of “development of a 
39   By protocol, the treaty area extended to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (territory south of the 17th parallel under 
jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam). Department of State Bulletin, September 20, 1954, 392-395.
40   FRUS, 1952-54, XII, pt.1, 597,607, 611, 614, 633, 643. Robert McClurkin, Deputy Director of the Ofﬁce of 
Northeast Asian Affairs further explored the idea with UK, Australia, and New Zealand Embassy ofﬁcials in 
Washington. See Sakata, op.cit., 74-76.
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more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Paciﬁc area” 
reﬂecting the Western Paciﬁc collective security concept in NSC 5429.41 
After the signing of the Manila pact, SEATO progressively developed as 
a collective security organization. Based on Article V of the Manila Treaty, 
SEATO established the Council of Foreign Ministers, which met annually, 
and headquarters in Bangkok. By decision at the first SEATO Council 
meeting in February 1955, the Council of Representatives (Ambassadors 
of signatory states), the Military Adviser’s Group (Chief of Staff or an 
Area Commander of signatory states; in the case of U.S., CINCPAC) was 
formed. Later in March 1957, the Military Planning Ofﬁce was established, 
and joint planning and exercises were conducted.42 
The U.S. continued to seek linkages with non-SEATO members. A 
policy document on Southeast Asia, NSC 5612/1 (September 1956) 
recommended that the U.S. “[p]articipate actively in SEATO, and seek to 
develop both its military and non-military aspects in a manner that will 
convincingly demonstrate the value of SEATO as a regional association, the 
usefulness of which extends beyond deterrence of Communist expansion,” 
and “encourage limited participation of non-Communist, non-SEATO 
Asian nations in certain SEATO activities.” 43  At the fourth meeting of the 
SEATO Council in 1958, the ﬁnal communiqué (March 13) read: “The 
Council considered that contacts between SEATO and non-member States 
41   Department of State Bulletin, December 13, 1954, 895-899 (emphasis added).
42   Les Buszynski, S.E.A.T.O.: Failure of an Alliance Strategy (Kent Ridge: Singapore University Press, 1983), 
chapters 1 and 2. Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume VI, The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and National Policy, 1955-1956 (Historical Ofﬁce, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., 1992), 221-228; Fairchild 
and Poole, op.cit., 217-220. 
43   NSC 5612/1, “Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia,” September 5, 1956, FRUS, 
1955-1957, Volume XXI, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos (USGPO, 1990), 257 (emphasis added).
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had proved useful in many respects and directed that, as circumstances 
permitted, such contacts be continued and expanded in the coming years.” 44
South Korea desired membership in SEATO45, but it was not realized. 
In the meantime, South Korea pursued its own initiatives to strengthen 
collective security in Asia. Even before the Korean War, South Korea, with 
Taiwan and the Philippines took initiative in forming a collective security 
pact in Asia and called for creation of a “Paciﬁc Pact”.46 In the aftermath 
of the Korean War, as the focus of attention shifted to Indochina, Rhee 
and Chiang Kai-shek strengthened efforts to establish anti-Communist 
organizations in Asia, and revived its proposals for a Paciﬁc Pact. In late 
November 1953, Rhee visited Taipei, with Army General Choi Duk-shin 
to promote a Paciﬁc defense pact. Chiang and Rhee advocated formation 
of an “Anti-Communist Uniﬁed Front” to be supported by the U.S..47 
The Chiang-Rhee collaboration expanded to include Southeast Asia. In 
December 1953, South Korea sent its first Southeast Asia mission, with 
General Choi as a leading member, and visited ROC, Malaysia, Vietnam 
and Thailand. Since South Korea did not have diplomatic relations with 
Southeast Asian countries, it conducted the trip with the assistance of ROC 
44   Department of State Bulletin, March 31, 1958, 505.
45   On February 27, 1955, after the ﬁrst SEATO Council meeting, ROK Foreign Minister Pyun Yung 
Tai, implicated that ROK was ready to join SEATO. Hanguk Oegyo Yonpyo [Chronology of ROK 
Diplomacy](Seoul: National Diet Library, 1974), 105.
46   The Paciﬁc Pact proposal of 1949 was rejected by the Truman administration. Sakata, op.cit., 34-35.
47   Choi Yong-ho,”Rishouban Seiken ni yoru Hankyou Gaikou no tenkai- Kankokuno Tounan Ajia gaikou 
no hajimari [Syngman Rhee’s Anti-Communist Diplomacy: Beginnings of South Korea’s Southeast Asia 
Diplomacy], Ajia Keizai [Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyujo, ed.] 32: 5 (May 1995), 58-59; Matsumoto Haruka, 
“Higashi Ajia ‘Zenshou Kokka’ niyoru Shudan Annzen Hoshou Taisei Kousou to Amerika no Taiou: ‘Taiheiyou 
Doumei’ to ‘Ajia Minzoku Hankyou Renmei’ wo Chusin-ni [“’Paciﬁc Pact’ and ‘the Asian People Anti-
Communist League’: American Reactions to the Proposals of the Two Security Pacts by ‘Outpost Countries’ 
in East Asia],” Ajia Taiheiyou Kenkyu [Tokyo: University of Tokyo] 5 (2005), 140-141.
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and U.S. embassies.48
But soon the initiative for collective security in Asia shifted to the United 
States. In spring of 1954, the U.S. began negotiations for SEATO, in which 
the Philippines and Thailand participated. South Korea, in the meantime, 
continued diplomacy to create its own version of Asian collective security 
grouping which eventually came to be known as “The Asian People’s Anti-
Communist League” (hereafter, APACL). 49
APACL was inherently weak because most of the representatives were 
of “non-ofﬁcial” status. Of the eight countries and areas that participated, 
only the divided countries ---South Korea, Nationalist China and South 
Vietnam--- sent government ofﬁcials. The Philippines and Thailand avoided 
ofﬁcial contacts, since they focused on SEATO. Macao/Hong Kong and the 
Ryukyus were not independent countries but administrative areas. APACL 
also excluded the Japanese government, due to ROK opposition. 
The U.S. was skeptical of the ROK-led initiative, and declined to 
participate. One reason was that it did not involve Japan. In February 
1954, when General John E. Hull, Commander-in-Chief, Far East 
(CINCFE) visited Korea, Rhee requested U.S. participation, but Hull 
replied that unless Japan was included in these organizations, the U.S. 
government will not provide support, and instead called for resumption 
of Japan-ROK normalization talks.50 Japanese membership was also a 
contentious issue between Rhee and Chiang. Chiang believed that Japan 
should be included in Asian collective security organizations, but Rhee 
adamantly opposed. Japanese membership continued to be an issue 
48   South Korea sent a second mission to Southeast Asia in February-March 1954, which included visits to ROC, 
Indonesia, Burma, Thailand. Choi, op.cit, Matsumoto, op.cit.
49   The ﬁrst APACL meeting was held in Chinhae, Korea in June 1954. Choi, op.cit., 60-61, Matsumoto, op.cit., 
144-148.
50   Tong-a Ilbo (Seoul), February 8, 1954, cited in Matsumoto, op.cit., 146.
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between Seoul and Taipei.51 
American observers participated in APACL meetings. One observer 
at the ﬁfth annual conference in June 1959, reported as follows: “the 
conference was successful within limits set by [the] obvious fact [that] 
APACL [is] largely [a] paper organization which lacks the organizational 
machinery necessary [to] play a really effective role. Delegations [are] 
uneven in quality, with Australians, Turks, Chinese and Koreans quite 
outstanding but others comprising obvious non-entities who probably 
have little support.” 52 As one biographer of Syngman Rhee noted: “an 
alliance of South Korea, Formosa, and Japan would have represented a 
very real military potential backed up by the heavy industry of Japan. 
But Rhee’s attitude towards Japan precluded Tokyo’s participating in any 
grouping that included South Korea; in fact, it soon became apparent that 
a major function of the league [APACL], in Rhee’s view, was to alert his 
fellow Asians against the menace of resurgent Japan.” 53
Links with SEATO: the Military Dimension
Despite the discord on the diplomatic front, U.S. and ROK interests 
began to converge on the military front. Military contacts between ROK 
and SEATO were promoted to strengthen military capabilities to deal with 
contingencies in Southeast Asia.
By 1957, SEATO had developed to a point where the Military Planning 
51   In September 1957, an editorial in the Korean Republic (government-supported newspaper) noted Japanese 
membership as one of the problems to be solved at the Taipei Conference, but criticized that Japan has “no 
immediate intension of opposing Communism.” JOINT WEEKA, vol.7, op.cit., 218. 
52   JOINT WEEKA, vol.8, 1959, op.cit., 162.  
53   Richard Allen, Korea’s Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 
1960), 188. The conference was used as a forum to criticize Japanese policies. For example, the ﬁfth APACL 
conference called for Japan to “to desist from negotiating with DPRK and resume talks with ROK” (June 10, 
1959), JOINT WEEKA, vol.8, 1959 op.cit., 162.
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Ofﬁce was established to promote joint planning and exercises. The U.S. 
tried to avoid earmarking forces for SEATO, since it had commitments 
elsewhere, but by 1958-59, upon Asian and Australian insistence, 
designated some of its forces as task forces for SEATO, while avoiding the 
establishment of a uniﬁed command like NATO.54 At the same time, the U.S. 
began to promote military exchanges with non-SEATO members. Secretary 
Dulles proposed the following in Manila at the Fourth SEATO Council of 
Ministers meeting in March 1958, both of which were adopted: acceptance 
of a NATO proposal for contact with other defense organizations, and the 
“authority to have contacts at the military personnel level with non-pact 
countries of the area, such as South Korea and Formosa.” 55 
Why South Korea and Formosa (Nationalist China)? As reﬂected in the 
JCS memorandum (NSC 5416) of August 1954, the JCS Chairman Radford 
and others strongly supported developing an Asian regional defense force: 
one in which local forces would provide ground forces, and the U.S. would 
support with strategic mobile striking power.56 The JCS had counted on a 
rearmed Japan and its forces to contribute to the collective defense of the 
Far East, but Japan resisted.57 Nationalist China and South Korean forces 
54   Condit, op.cit., 221-228; Fairchild and Poole, op.cit., 218-219; Buszynski, op.cit., 49-50.
55   Letter from the Secretary of State to the President, Manila, March, 11, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, XVI, East 
Asia-Paciﬁc Region; Cambodia; Laos (USGPO, 1992), 6 (emphasis added).  
56   On NSC 5416, see footnote 8, Sakata, op.cit., 66-69. General James Van Fleet was also a strong advocate of a 
Asian regional defense force. Ibid., 70-71.
57   NSC 6008/1, “United States Policy toward Japan” (June 11, 1960) read: “The present mission of the Japanese 
forces, other than that of supporting the police in the maintenance of internal security, is to participate in the 
defense of the Japan area. Any expansion of this mission to use those forces outside the Japan area is barred 
by Article 9 of the Constitution which, as it is presently interpreted, limits the deployment of Japanese military 
forces to the self-defense of Japan.” Japan’s contribution to “Free World strength will be principally as an 
economic force and as a moderating inﬂuence on the Afro-Asian area. Unless there is signiﬁcant change in 
Japanese thinking on military matters, Japan is not likely to enter regional security arrangements, but the 
availability of logistic facilities and military bases to the United States will contribute signiﬁcantly to Free 
World military strength in the Paciﬁc.” FRUS, 1958-60, XVIII, 340, 343.   
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were also candidates. NSC 5416 recommended that assistance and support 
be provided to the forces of South Korea and Nationalist China not only 
for internal security, but also as “prospective contributors to the community 
defense effort in the Far East.” 58 Since Japan could not contribute forces 
to regional defense, the value of the ROC and ROK forces increased. NSC 
5723, the policy statement on Nationalist China, explicitly stated that the 
U.S. “continue military assistance and direct forces support for the GRC 
armed forces” to enable them ”to contribute to collective non-Communist 
strength in the Far East.” 59 Policy on the ROK forces was not as explicit 
as the ROC forces on roles beyond territorial defense, since priority was 
placed on deterring and defending against a North Korean attack, while 
alleviating the military burden on its weak economy.60  Holding the line in 
Korea was the primary role for ROK forces, but a regional military role was 
implicit in the policy. NSC 5907 noted as a current U.S. policy objective, 
to assist ROK to make a “substantial contribution to Free World strength 
in the Pacific area” by adding a new role to the ROK forces: Maintain 
ROK forces capable of, not only deterring and resisting aggression by 
North Korea and Communist China in Korea (with the U.S. forces), but 
also “exercising the degree of power and range of capabilities sufﬁcient to 
demonstrate throughout Asia the continuing determination of the Republic 
of Korea to oppose Communist aggression.” 61 
58   Memorandum by Wilson to Lay, April 10, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, XII, pt.1, 419 (emphasis added). See also, 
Lee (1996), op.cit., 88-89.
59   NSC 5723, U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China, October 4, 1957, FRUS, 
1955-1957, Vol.III, China (USGPO, 1986),620-622. Fairchild and Poole, op.cit., 208.
60   Ibid., 198-201.
61   NSC 5907, Statement of U.S. Policy toward Korea, July 1, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, XVIII, 573 (emphasis 
added).  
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Military personnel exchanges between ROK and Southeast Asia were 
promoted since 1954, after the Korean War. The U.S. saw the ROK forces 
as a role model for the Southeast Asian countries. In a memorandum to 
General Maxwell Taylor (CINCFE/CINCUNC) on ROK forces, Dulles 
emphasized: “As the strongest Allied military force in the Far East, 
although by necessity conﬁned to Korea, the ROK Army’s existence is a 
powerful, if not determining, factor in shaping Korean relations with Far 
Eastern countries. It appears also as a goal towards which the other free 
Asian countries, especially in Southeast Asia, aspire, as we wish them to 
do. The ROK military establishment is factor of great import in the Far 
East and, as the largest and most effective standing army in the area on our 
side, will continue to be so for some time.”62 The U.S., discussed, with the 
French, about adapting training methods for the ROK forces, regarded as 
a successful case for war-ﬁghting, to strengthen the Indochina/Vietnamese 
forces.63 Military observation missions between ROK and Vietnam were 
exchanged since 1954,64 and the ROK established diplomatic relations with 
the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) headed by Ngo Dinh Diem in 
October 1955. The two countries continued military exchanges with the 
62   Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, Seoul, May 30, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, 
XXIII, 104.
63   Memorandum of U.S.-French Talks at Quai d’Orsay, April 22, 1954, FRUS, 1952-54, XIII, part 1, Indochina 
(USGPO, 1982), 484; Matsuoka Kan,”1950 nendai Amerika no Doumei Saihen Senryaku: Togo no Mosaku 
(America’s Alliance Realignment Strategy in the 1950’s: Search for Integration),” Kokusai Seiji (Tokyo: 
Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, ed.) (January 1994), 85; Matsumoto, op.cit., 149
64   In his memoirs, ROK General Paik Sun Yup noted that the U.S. military tried to apply the ROK force build-up 
program to Southeast Asia. Vietnamese Army ofﬁcers, including Colonel Nguyen Van Thu who later became 
President also visited ROK. General Paik visited the Vietnam Army Ofﬁcers Academy in 1954. Paik Sun 
Yup, Wakaki Shougun no Chousen Sensou [The Young General’s Korean War] (Tokyo: Soushisha, 2000), 423. 
Matsumoto, op.cit.
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support of the U.S.65 
In addition to military exchanges, ROK troop deployments to Indochina 
and the broader Southeast Asian region were considered by the Eisenhower 
administration. ROK offers to send troops to Indochina were made in 
January-February and June-July 1954, in light of the Dienbienphu crisis.66 
Admiral Radford favored deployment, but others including the President 
were cautious, and thus the proposal was declined, but the ROK troop 
option was kept open for future contingencies.67 Further offers were made 
in February 1958, to send troops to Indonesia to aid the anti-government 
non-communist guerillas in Sumatra, and to Laos in May 1959 to help the 
Laos government resist the Pathet Laos communist insurgency, both of 
which were declined at the time. 68 
65   President Ngo Dinh Diem sent several military delegations to Seoul. In return, the ROK sent a twenty-member 
Tae Kwon Do team (headed by MG. Choi Hong Hee) to visit eight cities in Vietnam during March 4-15, 1959. 
Kyudok Hong, Unequal Partners: ROK-US Relations During the Vietnam War (PhD. Dissertation, University 
of South Carolina,1991), 95. In 1958, ROK Chief-of-Staff Paik Sun Yup visited South Vietnamese Army upon 
invitation from the South Vietnam Defense Minister. This was realized through the good ofﬁces of General 
Samuel T. Williams, Chief of U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Republic of Vietnam. Matsumoto, 
op.cit., 150, footnote 88. ROK Ambassador to Vietnam, General Choi Duk Shin also recommended ROK Navy 
and Air Force visits to Southeast Asia, in light of SEATO’s increasing strategic importance to ROK. Lee (1996), 
op.cit.,103, footnote 44. 
66  ROK offered a range of one to three divisions for deployment to Laos. See Sakata, op.cit., 82-86.
67  Ibid.
68   The Sumatra insurgency was put down by President Sukarno in April-May 1958, and Sukarno continued his 
leftward leaning policy line until the military coup in 1965. Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson 
lamented that the insurgency forces were so weak, that if ROK forces were deployed, only Korean soldiers 
would be in combat. The Indonesian newspapers, at the time, ran reports, that Rhee was planning to send 
“volunteer forces” to help the insurgency, and ROK Ambassador to Vietnam, Choi Duk-shin, was secretly 
meeting insurgency leaders in Singapore. Choi did not deny this news in his report to Rhee. In the Laos crisis, 
Rhee, in May 1959, directed Choi to contact the Laos government to inform them that ROK is ready to send 
“volunteer forces”, and through the Korean Embassy in U.S., requested the U.S. government’s approval 
of deploying two divisions to Laos. But JCS declined the offer stating that there was concern that it would 
weaken Korea’s defense posture. Lee (1996), op.cit., 97-98.; Fairchild and Poole, op.cit., 221-222. In a 
conversation with the UK Prime Minister, Dulles acknowledged ROC and ROK interests in contributing forces 
to the Indonesia, but was inclined to keep the matter “among only Anglo-Saxon countries.” Memorandum of 
Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 9, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, XVI, 41.
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IV. Conclusion
The Western Paciﬁc collective security idea was too ambitious for Asia 
in the 1950’s, as the Eisenhower Administration soon realized. By the 
end of 1959, the Administration came to terms with the reality: discord 
among Asia-Paciﬁc allies and reluctance of the European allies (British and 
French in Southeast Asia) prevented the establishment of a comprehensive 
pact. Asia-hands in the State Department focused on the political reality, 
and advised caution to the Europeanists such as Dulles and to the Asia-
ﬁrsters in the military. Eventually the language regarding Western Paciﬁc 
collective security was modified. The term “comprehensive collective 
security arrangement” was deleted from NSC 5913 (September 1959), the 
policy statement on the Far East, and read:
“Promote and strengthen our multilateral (SEATO, ANZUS) and 
bilateral (with Korea, GRC[Republic of China], Japan and the 
Philippines) defense arrangements in the West Pacific and develop 
wider understanding of common purposes among all our allies and 
other friends in the Far East.” 69 
Accordingly, Korea policy was modiﬁed. NSC 5907(July 1959) included 
the Western Pacific collective security idea but the goal to pursue it “as 
soon as possible” was deleted.70 By 1960, in NSC 6018, reference to the 
69 NSC 5913, “Statement of U.S. Policy in the Far East,” September 25, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, XVI, 139.
70   Note by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the NSC on U.S. Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5907), July 1, 1959, 
FRUS, 1958-1960, XVIII, 571.
29
The Western Paciﬁc Collective Security Concept and Korea in the Eisenhower Years: 
The U.S.-ROK Alliance as an Asia-Paciﬁc Alliance
idea was completely deleted. 71
Thus, the Western Paciﬁc collective security idea gave way to a more 
modest goal of strengthening the existing alliances in the Asia-Paciﬁc. The 
alternative course, however, was also wrought with many difficulties, as 
examined in the context of U.S.-Korea relations.
In Northeast Asia, Japan-ROK relations was the key, but the bilateral 
relationship at the time was going through the most contentious period. The 
Eisenhower administration tried to promote normalization talks between 
the two allies, but South Korea under Rhee resisted being integrated into 
the U.S. scheme centered on Japan. U.S. and ROK views on Japan were 
never reconciled by the end of the Eisenhower’s term. Thus neither a 
NEATO nor a trilateral pact among the three allies was possible.
In Southeast Asia, there was also discord on the diplomatic front. The 
U.S. failed to link the Northeast Asian allies to SEATO, due to opposition 
from SEATO members. South Korea, in the meantime, took the initiative, 
with Nationalist China, to create its own version of an anti-Communist 
Asia collective security pact, and attempted to incorporate the U.S. into its 
scheme, without success. In response to the Indochina crisis, Rhee solicited 
participation from ROC and Southeast Asian countries and established 
the “Asian People’s Anti-Communist League” in June 1954, but it was 
intrinsically weak. ROK could not obtain full cooperation from Southeast 
Asian countries (namely Philippines and Thailand), and the exclusion of 
Japan was another ﬂaw. Not only the U.S. but also Chiang Kai-shek did not 
agree with Rhee on the exclusion of Japan in Asian pacts. Eventually, the 
71   Note by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the NSC on U.S. Policy Toward Korea (NSC 6018), November 28, 
1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, XVIII, 699-707. 
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focus shifted to the U.S.-led SEATO. 
Thus, the Eisenhower years were one of discord for the U.S.-ROK 
alliance in the Asia-Paciﬁc, but there was one area where some progress 
was made: the military front in Southeast Asia. In the late 1950’s, military 
exchanges between ROK and Vietnam were promoted, in the context of 
SEATO – non-SEATO allied cooperation. The U.S. saw the ROK forces as 
a model for Southeast Asian countries, especially South Vietnam, another 
divided country. The ROK government even offered troops to Indochina 
and other areas as part of the collective defense effort. This was welcomed 
especially by the Asia-ﬁrsters in the JCS, and was considered as an option, 
though not in the 1950’s, but for the future. 
Eventually, U.S.-ROK interests converged further in the 1960’s, with the 
emergence of a new generation of leadership in the ROK. During the Park 
Chung-hee regime, Japan-Korea normalization was realized in 1965, and 
in the same year, the President Lyndon B. Johnson requested deployment 
of ROK combat troops to Vietnam. SEATO was in decline after its failure 
to deal effectively with the Laos crisis in 1959-60, and was essentially 
replaced by a “quasi-alliance” formed by troop contributing members of 
SEATO (U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand) with non-
SEATO members, South Korea and South Vietnam.72 On Philippine and 
South Korean initiative, this time with U.S. support, the allies gathered 
in Manila in October 1966, to hold the Seven-nation Conference, or the 
Manila Conference. This short-lived Asia-Paciﬁc allied cooperation began 
and ended with the Vietnam War. But it was the ﬁrst time the U.S.-ROK 
alliance functioned as an Asia-Pacific alliance, and its legacies need to 
examined in future studies. 
72  Buszynski, op.cit., 135-140.
